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INTRODUCTION
This Note explores the use of intellectual property in a form of
e-commerce retail arbitrage sometimes called “drop-shipping.”
Specifically, the Note explores potential copyright, trademark, and
patent claims that might arise through this business model.
The retail market of large e-commerce websites, such as
Amazon, eBay, Alibaba, and Wayfair have changed the way
businesses operate. More and more, customers choose the ease and
convenience of online shopping over traditional methods without
any thought as to where the item originated or who the seller might
be.1 Many buyers are under the impression that the searchability of
the internet will guarantee a low price for an item because retailers
would be required to sell for the lowest prices to make a sale on the
internet.2 However, this is not necessarily true, and because many
buyers do not compare prices, they do not always get the lowest
price for internet purchases.3 As a result, the internet creates a
prime market for e-commerce arbitrage businesses to look for price
discrepancies and use these differences for a profit—this is called
drop-shipping. This new business model has impressive
popularity, and it is used by tens of thousands of businesses.
Drop-shipping has many allusive names. It is sometimes called
drop-shipping, product fulfillment services, order fulfillment,
shipping fulfillment services, supply chain solutions, and so on.
“Drop-shipping” is the most common label, though it is a
misnomer because “drop-shipping” originally referred to a
business agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor. The
original “drop-shipping” business model is similar to e-commerce
arbitrage, but different in important ways. First, under traditional
drop-shipping, the manufacturer and distributor are aware of each
other and have negotiated the terms of their arrangement. Second,
the terms of traditional drop-shipping have been agreed to
in advance of any sales transactions. All of that said, I will refer

1. See generally J. Yannis Bakos, Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic
Marketplaces, 43 MGMT. SCI. 12 (1997), http://people.stern.nyu.edu/bakos/emkts.pdf (last
visited Mar. 15, 2022) (suggesting that the electronic marketplace is expanding because of
reduced search costs for buyers).
2. See generally id.
3. Id.; Jason Feifer, Why It’s Nearly Impossible to Stop this Amazon and eBay Scheme,
ENTREPRENEUR (July 27, 2016), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/278622.
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to e-commerce arbitrage businesses as “drop-shipping” or
“drop-shippers” because it is the most recognized term.
Drop-shipping is a fairly standard application of retail
arbitrage: buy something cheap, take it to a market where it sells
for more, and resell it for a profit. What is interesting and novel is
that many drop-shippers do not warehouse the products they sell,
nor do they have agreements with the distributors and
manufacturers to act as drop-shippers. The following example
demonstrates how drop-shipping works: an item listed on Home
Depot’s website for $100 is also listed on Amazon for $150.4
Without purchasing the item, the drop-shipper will create a virtual
store on Amazon and list the item for $140, overselling the Home
Depot listing, but undercutting the Amazon listing. When a buyer
purchases the item at the reduced cost on Amazon, the dropshipper will then purchase the item from Home Depot’s website, as
a gift, and have it shipped directly to the buyer. 5 The drop-shipper
will earn a $40 profit while the Amazon seller loses out on a sale of
the item.
Unauthorized drop-shippers are problematic for IP owners and
manufacturers in at least two ways. First, drop-shipping causes
increased product returns.6 The exact reason for this is unknown,
but one theory is that the drop-shipped products alert customers to
the possibility that the item could be purchased for less somewhere
else. For example, when a buyer orders a product from Amazon,
but the shipment arrives in a box with a Home Depot label, a
customer may look up the item on Home Depot’s website and find
the cheaper listing. After discovering the price difference, a
disappointed customer may return the item and repurchase it for a
lower price.7 Distributors and manufacturers have seen returns
increase dramatically because of this phenomenon.8
4. Brittany Frandsen, Online Arbitrage: Why Amazon Orders Sometimes Come from
Walmart, WORKMAN NYDEGGER (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.wnlaw.com/blog/onlinearbitrage-why-amazon-orders-sometimes-come-from-walmart/.
5. Id. The price discrepancy utilized in this example is exaggerated for the purpose
of clarity in describing the business model. Most drop-shippers have smaller profit margins.
6. Reply All, The World’s Most Expensive Free Watch, GIMLET (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://gimletmedia.com/shows/reply-all/dvhe3l.
7. In fact, most drop-shippers charge a “restocking fee” for product returns, and they also
make money on the return of the product even though they are not actually restocking the item.
8. Planet Money, Cat Scam, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, at 07:22 (Mar. 13, 2019,
11:49 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=703017193
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Second, manufacturers face problematic contractual obligations
with e-commerce platforms when drop-shippers intermingle with
the transaction. In some instances, manufacturers guarantee a sale
price to fulfillment centers on an e-commerce platform. If the
product is sold for less than that price, the fulfillment center charges
the price difference to the manufacturer. Prices can drop
significantly when drop-shippers begin selling the product for a
lower price because fulfillment centers often have automatic
pricing. For example, take a manufacturer who has arranged for an
Amazon Fulfillment Center to sell an item for $150. When a
drop-shipper lists the item for $140, the Amazon Fulfillment Center
will automatically update its listing to $139. When a buyer
purchases the item for $139, the manufacturer will owe the
fulfillment center $11 for the sale of the item. This can potentially
devastate the manufacturer’s profits, especially when large
numbers of sales aggregate together.
In addition to the two harms listed above, manufacturers and
distributors are also concerned with brand consistency,9 trademark
dilution,10 and client experience. Many manufacturers strive to
control every piece of distribution in order to drive sales through
positive interactions. Drop-shippers are an additional, unknown
distributor that manufacturers find threatening because they are
uncontrollable. Furthermore, when a listing appears from an
unknown seller, an IP owner may be suspicious that the
drop-shipper is selling counterfeits. Thus, even where the
drop-shipper is selling a legitimate product, manufacturers are
wary because (short of purchasing the product from the
drop-shipper) the manufacturer has no way of identifying
counterfeit listings.
On the other hand, drop-shipping is also beneficial. The dropshipper may increase sales for the manufacturers and distributors
because drop-shipping activities maximize the market. The dropshippers essentially work as a low-cost marketing team and
encourage more products to be sold in presumably new markets
(i.e., on a different platforms).11 Drop-shipped products are
eventually purchased from the original manufacturer or distributor
(patent owner alleging that his returns have increased to 200 due to ecommerce arbitrage,
then falling to 2 returns after the drop-shipping stopped).
9. Feifer, supra note 3.
10. Planet Money, supra note 8.
11. Feifer, supra note 3.
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and therefore, also increase the sales to the original owners. In
addition, this business model provides home-bound people an
ability to earn money where they might not otherwise have the
opportunity.12 Lastly, drop-shipping is available to poor
populations because the startup costs of drop-shipping are low and
virtually anyone can start a drop-shipping business.13
Conflicts over drop-shipping have not been litigated in the
courts for several reasons. First, many drop-shippers are judgment
proof. The typical drop-shipper is a low-income earner who started
drop-shipping as an alternate source of income.14 Second, the
defendants are difficult to identify because e-commerce platforms
do not require that sellers disclose any of the identifying
information necessary to file a complaint. Furthermore,
e-commerce platforms carefully guard the personal information of
each seller.15 It can be difficult, or even impossible, to identify a
single drop-shipper who has made enough profit from dropshipping to justify litigation to recover those lost profits.16 And
finally, each individual drop-shipper may use dozens or even
hundreds of virtual stores, each set up under separate LLCs.17 Thus,
cases against drop-shippers have the added difficulty of piercing
the corporate veil in order to conglomerate enough transactions to
justify a law suit.
Another hurdle to litigation is the minimal damages that can be
collected from any single drop-shipper. While the occasional dropshipper may collectively have lucrative earnings, the individual
transactions earn only small profits. The IP owner may not have
enough damages from a single drop-shipper to justify a suit. The
difficulty of litigation increases in complexity and cost with each
drop-shipper that must be identified. The problem is a systematic
issue, where individual IP owners are being harmfully affected by
12. Id.
13. Though it has not been proven, journalists allege that the drop-shippers who make
the most money do not make the money through drop-shipping but through related
products, such as classes, access to materials for drop-shippers, and software services. See e.g
Jake Tran, Dropshipping is a HORRIBLE Business & You Shouldn’t Do It, YOUTUBE (Dec. 11,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FDkn9dDuJfM.; Planet Money, supra note 8.
14. See Feifer, supra note 3; see also Planet Money, supra note 8.
15. Map
Cop,
Anonymity
and
The
Amazon
Marketplace,
MAPCOP,
https://www.mapcop.com/blog/anonymity-and-the-amazon-marketplace (last visited on
Mar. 16, 2022).
16. Id.
17. See generally Planet Money, supra note 8 (explaining the mechanics of drop-shipping).
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many drop-shippers and the IP owner does not have an effective
way to recover from that harm. For this reason, intellectual
property owners must seek a systematic solution.
The application of intellectual property rights against dropshippers has many unanswered questions. Nonetheless, the legal
questions are interesting to consider because the drop-shipping
business model is a unique creation of the modern-day e-commerce
marketplace. This Note attempts to summarize relevant law and
identify the key issues that a court would consider in resolving an
infringement conflict between an intellectual property owner and
a drop-shipper.
Notably, drop-shippers sell a large array of products, offering
almost any product where a price difference on the internet can be
exploited. Although some of the drop-shipper’s products may be
protected by intellectual property laws, many products are not.
This Note is limited only to drop-shippers’ use of intellectual
property and not to other issues that may be associated with the
business model (i.e., unfair competition). Specifically, this Note
seeks to determine whether the activities of drop-shippers
constitute infringement of the intellectual property and propose
how drop-shippers can avoid IP infringement. However, the Note
does not explore the remedies available to an IP owner if
infringement is found. Future research may include causes of action
outside of intellectual property and remedies available to IP owners
where infringement occurs.
I will begin in Part I by exploring the issues that arise under 35
U.S.C. § 271(a) for patent infringement by way of an unauthorized
offer to sell, or a sale, of a patented item. This analysis will include
the limitations posed by patent exhaustion and limited case law. It
seems that most likely, the activities of drop-shipping do not
infringe as an unauthorized sale but do infringe as an unauthorized
offer to sell. Next, in Part II, I will examine the possibility of
trademark infringement under the Landham Act, including a
trademark owner’s right to quality control and trademark dilution,
where likely the drop-shippers do not infringe trademark. Thirdly,
in Part III, I will explore the possibility of copyright infringement,
which exists in certain cases but has largely been eliminated by the
e-commerce platforms. Finally, I will propose a solution to the
systematic issue between drop-shippers and IP owners.
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I. PATENT INFRINGEMENT
A. Background of Patent Infringement Laws
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) states: “[W]hoever without authority makes,
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the
United States or imports into the United States any patented
invention during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the
patent.”18 Essentially, a patent owner is given the right to a
temporary monopoly of the invention. A patent owner may sell or
license their intellectual property, but absent those authorizations,
anyone who makes, uses, sells, or offers to sell the patented item
has infringed on the monopoly and is liable to the patent owner.
Originally, U.S. patent law limited patent infringement to
activities in the United States and the “threat of a sale” was not
considered patent infringement.19 However, growing pressure
arising from international infringement and an effort to bring U.S.
patent law into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement motivated
Congress to an amendment in 1994 which added the “offer to sell”
language to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).20 “The 1994 amendment to § 271
significantly expanded the scope of protection offered by U.S.
patent law, allowing the patentees to act against threats to its
monopoly even when no actual sale had occurred within the
United States.”21
Traditionally, patent infringement cases are brought against
manufacturers who are making counterfeit products. However, the
prominence of e-commerce today has shifted the dynamics, and
more often patent owners are bringing infringement cases against
retailers as well.22 One cause of this shift is the ability of the patent
owners to find the infringing retailers easily through an internet
18. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
19. Yan Wang, “Offer to Sell” Infringement Involving Crossborder Transactions: Lessons
from Transocean, 10 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 579, 581 (2012).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Herbert J. Hammond & Justin S. Cohen, Intellectual Property Issues in E-Commerce,
18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 743, 746 (2012) (“Today’s Internet retailers may list and sell
products from a far wider variety of sources than ever before. But such freedom comes with
consequences. One such consequence is that the Internet makes it easy for a patent owner to
find potential infringers selling a product or service and to target them in a lawsuit. Patent
owners who traditionally sued only the manufacturer of such products are now targeting retailers,
especially where the manufacturer is offshore or does not have the financial wherewithal to
be responsible for its infringing acts.”) (emphasis added).
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search.23 Patent owners can more easily target a retailer for a
lawsuit than ever before.24 Retailers must be more careful to protect
themselves against infringement lawsuits by selling patented
items legally.25
Although retailers selling counterfeit products is clearly
infringement, whether drop-shipping also qualifies as patent
infringement is less obvious. From here, we turn to the court’s
interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) to consider the legality of dropshipper’s activities.
B. Unauthorized Sale as a Form of Patent Infringement
Whether or not drop-shipping is patent infringement is
wrought with legal ambiguity. Drop-shipping is a new type of
business model which operates in a way that was not possible prior
to the internet. It is difficult to fit the facts of drop-shipping to the
laws of patent exhaustion that were developed long before the
advent of e-commerce platforms. The policy arguments (which
probably favor the drop-shipper) will play an important role in
these cases.
1. The Ability of a Patent Owner to Recover from an Unauthorized Sale
Is Limited by Patent Exhaustion
The most important issue in determining if drop-shipping is
patent infringement is whether or not the patent over an item has
exhausted. Patent owners have the right to prohibit others from
selling their patented invention. “A defendant may be guilty of
invading the monopoly, which includes the exclusive right to sell,
by selling articles which had not been freed from the

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. A manufacturer can identify which items are being sold by unauthorized dealers
because a drop-shipped item will arrive with identifying markers on the box, showing where
the item originated. For example, a product purchased from Amazon will arrive in a
Walmart shipping box (or with a shipping label or receipt). The IP owners can also identify
this by tightly controlling the licensee activity. That way, activity which does not conform to
the license agreement is likely a drop-shipper. For example, an IP owner can forbid a licensee
from selling product on an e-commerce platform, therefore any seller of that licensed product
is potentially a drop-shipper. Finally, the IP owner can communicate with its licensees when
a suspicious seller is discovered. If the licensed retailer disowns the seller on the e-commerce
platform, the sale of this item is likely unauthorized and constitutes patent infringement.
That is, of course, as long as the item does not fall within the second-hand market.
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monopoly . . . .”26 Furthermore, the patent owner can license, sell,
or otherwise grant their exclusive right to others. When a thirdparty chooses to sell the invention without permission from the
patent owner they have violated this exclusive right and the patent
owner may seek damages or an injunction against the party.
The relevance of a second-hand market is key because a patent
owner’s monopoly over an item is limited by the doctrine of patent
exhaustion. Patent exhaustion is described as follows:
[W]hen the [patented item] passes to the hands of the purchaser,
it is no longer within the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside
of it, and is no longer under the protection of the act of
Congress. . . . [The patented item] becomes his private, individual
property, not protected by the laws of the United States, but by
the laws of the State in which it is situated.27

In other words, once the patent owner has sold a particular
patented item, her control over it no longer exists and the buyer is
free to modify, use, or resell the item. “The longstanding doctrine
of patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive the initial
authorized sale of a patented item.”28 A patent owner cannot sue
the buyer for patent infringement after an authorized sale.

a. Patent exhaustion cannot be limited for price discrimination in the
primary market. Patent exhaustion becomes problematic for patent
owners who are trying to use price discrimination to increase
market size and profits. Price discrimination provides a mechanism
for patent owners to reach additional markets that were
unavailable at a certain price point. For example, pharmaceuticals
can be afforded at a higher price in the United States than they can
be afforded in other countries. By charging a higher price in a more
developed country, a pharmaceutical company can recoup research
and development costs for the drug, while also expanding its
market to countries and clients that are unable to pay the higher
costs. In this way, a pharmaceutical company can be incentivized

26. Bassick Mfg. Co. v. Auto Equip. Co., 13 F.2d 463, 464 (7th Cir. 1926).
27. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1852); see also Impression Prods., Inc.
v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523, 1523 (2017).
28. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 617 (2008).
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to invest money into research and development of new drugs, and
simultaneously the drug is more widely available to poorer
countries. However, this capability provides an adverse incentive
for a pharmaceutical company to charge a higher price in a market
simply because the market can afford to pay a higher price.
The result of price discrimination is a second-hand market
which engages in retail arbitrage. This market takes advantage of
these price differences by purchasing an item in one market and
transporting the item to a second market to be resold at a higher
price. In the past, intellectual property owners would maintain
these price differences by setting geographical limitations on an IP
license so that an item sold in one location could not be resold in
another location. This practice has been limited by recent Supreme
Court decisions which uphold international exhaustion after the
first sale.29
Similarly, IP owners also practice price discrimination on the
internet by offering the same products for difference prices on
different e-commerce platforms. Drop-shippers use this type of
market expansion to their gain. However, this arbitrage reduces the
capability of an IP owner to price discriminate. The consumer (and
the drop-shipper) view this as a positive effect of arbitrage. In fact,
price discrimination is more often viewed as a dishonest business
practice.30 Under this paradigm, the drop-shippers counteract the
price discrimination and bring equality to markets where
consumers are paying a higher price. However, an IP owner would
argue that the right to price discrimination is the right of an IP
owner that has been granted exclusive rights over the primary
market of the intellectual property.
Recent Supreme Court decisions have severely limited the
capability of an IP owner to price discriminate.31 As explained in
Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., the Patent Act
does not guarantee the patent owner a price for the item.32 What
is protected, is the opportunity for a patent owner to give up
her patent rights over an item for whatever he “deems to be

29. Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1523; see also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013).
30. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Pharmaceutical Price Discrimination and Social Welfare,
5 CAPITALISM & SOC’Y 1, 1 (2010) (corrected version).
31. Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1523; see also Kirtsaeng, 568 U.S. at 538.
32. Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1537.
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‘satisfactory compensation[.]’”33 Said another way, the patent
owner controls the first sale, or the primary market, and no further.
After the first sale the patent over the particular item “exhausts”
and the patent owner has given up his rights over the particular
item for the agreed upon compensation.34 After the first sale, the
buyer is free to sell the item on a secondary market. A secondary
market here does not necessarily mean a “second-hand” or a used
market, rather it is defined as a market which is not the primary
market where the manufacturer first sold the patented item.
Arbitrage activities generally take place on the secondary market
and therefore the patent owner cannot control the activities
of arbitrage.
b. Patents are enforceable in the primary market and exhausted in the
secondary market. The Court limited patent rights in the secondary
market in order to balance two important policies: the patent
owner’s rights to his monopoly and the adverse effect of
“extending the patent rights beyond the first sale . . . .”35 An
extension of patent rights “would clog the channels of
commerce, with little benefit from the extra control that the
patentees retain. And advances in technology, along with
increasingly complex supply chains, magnify the problem.”36 In
other words, if the patent owner was compensated for the
invention, the courts will favor exhausting the patent to keep
commerce simple in an increasingly complex market.
So, the ultimate question here is: does a drop-shipper sell
patented items as part of the primary or the secondary market? At
the time a drop-shipper creates a product listing they have not yet
purchased the items they are selling. The drop-shipper begins by
creating a listing for an item before the purchase of a particular
item. After a buyer has accepted the offer, the drop-shipper will
purchase the item and directly ship it to the buyer. It follows that
as long as the first transaction (between the retailer and the dropshipper) has exhausted the patent before the second transaction
(between the drop-shipper and the buyer), the patent over the
33. Id. at 1528 (internal citation omitted).
34. Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008) (“The longstanding
doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a patented item
terminates all patent rights to that item.”).
35. Impression Prods., Inc., 137 S. Ct. at 1532.
36. Id.
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particular item will exhaust. If this is the case, the second
transaction will be an authorized sale protected by the patent
exhaustion doctrine. However, if the patent has not yet exhausted
before the second transaction, the drop-shipper may be liable for
patent infringement.
The courts have specified that patent exhaustion occurs on
transfer of title of a particular item.37 Transfer of title probably
occurs at the completion of the sale.38 So, when does the transfer of
title occur in a drop-shipping transaction? The drop-shipper
initiates a transaction by posting a patented product for sale on an
e-commerce platform before the drop-shipper has purchased the
item. A buyer then purchases the item from the drop-shipper (this
is typically the second transaction in patent exhaustion).
Afterwards, the drop-shipper purchases the patented product,
usually from the IP owner or authorized dealer of the patented
product (this is typically the first transaction in patent exhaustion).
Thus, the first and second transactions are reversed from a typical set
of arbitrage transactions. Finally, the drop-shipper ships the item
directly to the buyer, which concludes the drop-shipping activity.
Thus, the question as to whether the drop-shipper is selling in
the primary or secondary market comes down to the timing of the
first and second transactions. Drop-shipping has two timing issues
that the court must answer. First, when is the first transaction
complete and the patent exhausts? And second, in determining the
“when” of the second transaction, is the court more interested in
when the sale initiates or terminates?
To the first issue, case law on the timing of a completed sale is
clearly summarized in Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds Engineering Co.:
It is well understood that delivery of the property is one of the
elements of a sale and “the transfer of the property in the thing is
effected by the transfer of the thing itself to the purchaser.”

37. Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549–50 (1853).
38. “In Benjamin on Sales § 1 the following are listed as elements of a sale: (1) parties
competent to contract; (2) mutual assent; (3) a thing, the absolute or general property in
which is transferred from the seller to the buyer, and (4) a price in money, paid or promised.
“If any one of the ingredients be wanting, there is no sale.” Ecodyne Corp. v. Croll-Reynolds
Eng’g Co., 491 F. Supp. 194, 197 (D. Conn. 1979) (citing Atkinson on Sales, 5). See generally
Butler v. Thomson, 92 U.S. 412, 414–15 (1875).
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In sum, a sale is an executed contract, to constitute which delivery
in fact or in law is indispensable . . . .39

A sale of an item is not complete until the item has been delivered
to the buyer and the elements of the contract have been fulfilled.40
Therefore, it seems likely that a court will view a patent to have
exhausted on delivery of the item to the buyer. It logically follows
that the court would also be interested in the date of delivery of the
second transaction.
Under this reasoning, the first and second transactions are
complete at the same moment: when the item is delivered to the
buyer. Without drop-shipping case law to view how a court would
interpret these two simultaneous transactions, the analysis comes
down to predicting the reasoning the court may apply. This could
be argued in two possible ways. The first is that the patent exhausts
because the second transaction is not after the first transaction. The
second is that the patent may not exhaust because the first
transaction was not before the second transaction.
That said, it is possible that the court will apply a different
reasoning which is focused on initiation of the second transaction.
Though not explicitly related, patent law depends heavily on the
timing of events, such as a statutory bar for items that have been
offered for sale to the public under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) and
AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).41 In these cases, the court is concerned
about the timing of the offer, and not the completion of the sale.42
The court may be similarly more interested in the initiation of the
unauthorized sale.43 In fact, one court explained that § 102(b)
provided a useful guide for determining the date of infringement
under § 271(a): “[w]hile recognizing that the two sections of the
Patent Act are based on distinct policy rationales, the Federal
Circuit has held that because ‘[b]oth sections invoke traditional
39. Ecodyne Corp., 491 F. Supp. at 197 (D. Conn. 1979) (internal citations omitted). See
generally Butler, 92 U.S. at 414–15 (1875); Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Sims, 191 U.S. 441, 447
(1903); Clemens v. Davis, 7 Pa. 263, 264 (1847).
40. Clemens, 7 Pa. at 264.
41. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Stena Drilling Ltd., 659
F. Supp. 2d 790, 797 (S.D. Tex. 2009).
42. Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67 (1998) (“We conclude, therefore, that the
on-sale bar applies when two conditions are satisfied before the critical date. First, the
product must be the subject of a commercial offer for sale. An inventor can both understand
and control the timing of the first commercial marketing of his invention.”).
43. Thomas L. Irving & Stacy D. Lewis, Proving A Date of Invention and Infringement
After GATT/TRIPS, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 309, 351 (1994).
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contractual analysis’ it is appropriate to use § 102(b) jurisprudence
to interpret the ‘sale’ and ‘offer to sell’ phrases in § 271(a).”44
The Transocean court holds the policies and practices of § 102(b)
to be applicable under § 271(a) because they both rely on contract
law. Arguably, contract law is not applicable in determining the
date of infringement because the policies and outcomes of contract
law are different from the policies and outcomes of patent law.45
However, courts do not favor this argument.46 Under this
reasoning, the timing of the second transaction would be the
initiation of the sale, or the date the drop-shipper accepted an offer
for the patented item. Because this occurs before the drop-shipper
has completed a purchase of a particular item it is not possible for
exhaustion to have occurred before the second transaction. Though
arguably, it seems inconsistent that a court would resort to an
analysis where it is interested in the completion of the first
transaction and the initiation of the second transaction. A court may
either choose the initiation or completion of both transactions. In
this case the court would consider the arguments presented above.
The drop-shipper will undoubtedly argue that the time
between the two transactions was small and irrelevant. In some
cases, drop-shippers use software to facilitate the two transactions
and the time between them can be miniscule. However, a wrong is
not made right just because it was righted eventually.47 In Honeywell
Int’l, Inc. v. United States, Honeywell sold infringing widgets to the
government and later obtained the patent for the widgets.48
They then sued the government for patent infringement under an

44. Transocean, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 797 (citing Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215
F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
45. R. CARL MOY, ACTS OF INFRINGEMENT—OFFERS FOR SALE—BASIC DEFINITION, 4
MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS §14:47 (4th ed., 2017) (“Even more fundamentally, perhaps the
strongest argument against adopting the law of contracts in a wholesale fashion is that
contract law is concerned with policies and outcomes that are quite different from those
involved in the law of patents. In particular, contract law is concerned with matters of
formation, breach, and resulting damages, in a transaction between two contesting parties.
The law of patent infringement, in contrast, is concerned primarily with the whether the
accused infringer has intruded unduly into the patent owner’s right to control the patented
invention’s supply into the marketplace. Notably, in this latter class of situations the person
with whom the accused infringer dealt is often not adverse [to] the accused infringer and, in
fact, is often not even a party at all.”).
46. Id.
47. Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1292, 1304 (2010).
48. Id. at 1293–97.
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unauthorized use of a patented item.49 The government argued that
they were precluded under patent exhaustion doctrine, because
they purchased the widgets from a party who eventually became
the patent owner.50 However, the Federal Circuit decided:
[The plaintiff’s] sale of infringing [widgets] was not authorized
because, at the time of the sale, [the plaintiff] had no rights under
the ‘914 patent, which [a third party] owned. The fact that [the
plaintiff] now owns the patent does not retroactively authorize
the earlier sale. As such, the [patent exhaustion] doctrine does not
preclude [the plaintiff] from recovering damages against the
[defendant] for use of infringing [widgets] . . . .51

The first sale must be an authorized sale at the time of the sale to
protect the seller via patent exhaustion. Which brings this analysis
full circle in trying to determine how the court will view the “time
of the sale” as the initiation or the completion of the second
transaction, which exhausts the patent over the item.
2. Policy Arguments in Favor of the Drop-Shipper
Recent Supreme Court decisions prefer policies which limit the
influence of the patent owner if the owner is justly compensated. In
Impression Products, the Court stressed the importance of balancing
the rights of the patent owner with the ability of patent monopolies
to “clog” commerce and frustrate the market. 52 The Court reasoned
that patent owners control the price for which they originally sold
the product and therefore, are justly compensated and there is little
or no benefit to the economy in protecting their rights beyond that
point.53 IP owners in a drop-shipping scheme have, in fact, received
compensation for the patented item. What’s more, drop-shippers
are probably unaware of when they are selling patented items or
not. Allowing the patent owners to restrict drop-shipping may have
a chilling effect on the secondary market, which the court would
probably view as “clog[ging] the channels of commerce.”54
Therefore, the court would likely not protect the rights of the patent

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 1296.
Id. at 1296–97.
Id. at 1304.
Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1529, 1532 (2017).
Id.
Id. at 1532.
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owner who exhausted their patent rights by selling a product for
“whatever [they] deem[] to be ‘satisfactory compensation.’”55
This policy argument is a strong one. Repeatedly, the courts
explain that they are very concerned with limiting secondary
markets.56 In fact, where infringement cases are brought over
products which are not counterfeits, the courts are much less
sympathetic to IP owners.57 Consider also the optics of a potential
drop-shipping case, which are more sympathetic to the dropshippers. Often, drop-shippers are people who are down on their
luck, or limited in their capacity to earn a traditional income. They
may be people who are unemployed, disabled, caretakers, or others
that are restricted their capacity to earn money. In addition, most
drop-shippers do not make as much money as is claimed.58 Courts
do not want to make this class of people liable to large
manufactures and patent owners. This policy argument is so strong
that it is possibly one of the reasons that drop-shipping cases have
not been litigated in court. As a result, the IP owners will need
incontrovertible evidence of infringement, and a strong argument
of legal reasoning.59
Litigation for infringement by unauthorized sale is an uphill
battle. Not only do the confusing facts and the lack of case law make
it difficult to know whether or not the patent has exhausted, but the
policies favored by the courts are against the litigating party.
To complicate matters more, complaints against a drop-shipper
face several procedural battles for bringing a suit that make it
55. Id. at 1537.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Investigative journalists estimate that most drop-shippers lose money or make
very little money. Planet Money, supra note 8; see also The World’s Most Expensive Free Watch,
REPLY ALL (Mar. 1, 2018), https://gimletmedia.com/shows/reply-all/dvhe3l.
59. Possibly, patent owners have attempted to bring infringement against dropshippers without alluding to the fact that the products were originally purchased from the
patent owners in order to avoid these policy arguments. Several cases in the courts read as
if the plaintiff is dancing around this issue. See Shane Matherne Enters., Inc. v. Sokolic, No.
04-2140, 2007, 2007 WL 1438736 (E.D. La. May 15, 2007); Mophie, Inc. v. Shah, No.: SA CV
13-01321-DMG (JEMx), 2014 WL 10988347(C.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2014); Mophie, Inc. v. Shah, No.
SA CV 13-01321 DMG (JEMx), 2014 WL 12603184 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2014); Benchmade Knife
Co. v. Benson, No. 08-967-HA, 2010 WL 988465 (Mar. 15, 2010); Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Allen
Air Conditioning Co., No. 08 Civ. 6152(KBF), 2014 WL 2506294 (May 5, 2014); Pearson Educ.,
Inc. v. Allen Air Conditioning Co., No. 08 Civ. 6152(KBF), No. 2014 WL 2154099 (May 22,
2014); Steelcase, Inc. v. Div. of Tax’n, 13 N.J. Tax 182 (1993); Tommy Bahama Group, Inc. v.
Sexton, No. C 07-06360 EDL, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112452 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2009); Weifang
Tengyi Jewelry Trading Co. v. Intuii LLC, 18 C 4651, 2020 WL 9173089 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 2020).
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difficult to know who they are and how much to collect in damages.
For this reason, it is unlikely to be litigated, and even if there is
infringement under unauthorized sale, it will likely go unenforced.
3. Resellers May Sell Particular Items Only Where the Patent Has
Exhausted over That Item
The Supreme Court has held that the doctrine of first sale under
copyright is similar enough to patent exhaustion that the principles
of each doctrine are interchangeable.60 Therefore, a good analogy in
copyright law is probably applicable to patent law. One such
analogy exists in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc. There, the court
granted rights to the copyright owner past the first sale when a
seller was trying to sell used digital music.61 In this case, Capitol
Records sued ReDigi for copyright infringement after ReDigi
created a scheme to sell “used” digital music online.62 The court
held that to be protected under the first sale doctrine the seller had
to be reselling a “particular” copy of the music.63 The process of
uploading and downloading the music to the ReDigi website, was
technically making a copy of the music, and the “used” version for
sale on ReDigi’s website was a copy, not the particular copy sold to
the original buyer.64 Moreover, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) protects only
distribution by “the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord . . .
of that copy or phonorecord.”65 The court explained that the only
way to be protected by the first sale doctrine is to sell the original
item.66 Therefore, a seller is not protected by selling even an
60. Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 137 S. Ct. 1529, 1536 (2017)
(“. . . differentiating the patent exhaustion and copyright first sale doctrines would make
little theoretical or practical sense: The two share a “strong similarity . . . and identity of
purpose,”) (citing Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 13 (1913)); see also Kirtsaeng v. John
Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 538 (2013); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984).
61. Capitol Recs., LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 910 F.3d 649, 652 (2d Cir. 2018).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 658.
64. Id.; This decision is controversial, especially considering the court suggested that
the only way a person could resell digital music would be to sell the original hard drive or
device to which the music was downloaded. By similar logic, every time a consumer buys a
new device and transfers digital files to the new device, they have committed copyright
infringement. Worse still, music saved to a cloud service would also be infringement every
time a user accessed it. However, the importance of particularity requirement is still relevant
despite the archaic understanding of how digital music is used and stored.
65. Id. at 655.
66. Id.
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identical item. To be protected by the first sale, and patent
exhaustion, the seller must have made an authorized purchase of
the particular item.67
Though a patent case has never turned on a particularity
requirement, as it did in ReDigi, the courts often use language of
particularity in patent exhaustion cases.68 This supports the
underlying legal principle that a buyer cannot thwart the patent
rights of the IP owner without compensating the IP owner for the
specific article first. Therefore, drop-shippers are potentially
unprotected by patent exhaustion because they do not sell a
particular item. Rather, they are selling the invention protected by
a patent generally and then later obtain title to a particular item.
However, at the time of the original offer and acceptance (by the
buyer) the drop-shipper has infringed the patent. Despite the
fact that drop-shippers are selling an identical product, the
drop-shippers do not sell a particular product, so the sale is not
protected by patent exhaustion.
While the issue of particularity strengthens the case of IP
owners against drop-shippers, it likely does not outweigh the
67. Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liu, 656 F. Supp. 2d 407, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (By § 109(a)’s
terms, the first-sale doctrine applies if two conditions are satisfied. First, the person claiming
the doctrine’s protection must hold title to a particular copy—that person must be “the
owner” of the copy. And second, the copy must have been “lawfully made under this title.”)
(emphasis omitted); see also Ranieri v. Adirondack Dev. Grp., LLC, 164 F. Supp. 3d 305, 350
(N.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. Harmony Computs. & Elecs., Inc., 846 F. Supp.
208, 212 (E.D.N.Y. 1994); accord Mapinfo Corp. v. Spatial Re–Eng’ring Consultants, No.
02–CV–1008 DRH, 2006 WL 2811816, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006)) (“Furthermore, ‘the
defendant has the burden of proving that the particular pieces of the copyright work that he
sold were lawfully made or acquired.’”).
68. Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 456 (1873) (“That is to say, the patentee or his assignee
having in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use
of his invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentees.”); see also Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895) (“The article, in the language of the court,
passes without the limit of the monopoly. That is to say, the patentee or his assignee having
in the act of sale received all the royalty or consideration which he claims for the use of his
invention in that particular machine or instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser
without further restriction on account of the monopoly of the patentee.); Bloomer v.
Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 351–52 (1863) (“By a valid sale and purchase the patented machine
becomes the private individual property of the purchaser, and is no longer specially
protected by the laws of the United States, but by the laws of the State in which it is situated.
Hence it is obvious, say the court, that if a person legally acquires a title to that which is the
subject of letters patent, he may continue to use it until it is worn out, or he may repair it or
improve upon it as he pleases, in the same manner as if dealing with property of any other
kind.”); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 569 U.S. 278, 284 (2013) (“[T]he [patent exhaustion]
doctrine restricts a patentee’s rights only as to the ‘particular article’ sold . . . .”).
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court-favored policy arguments and legal ambiguity which favor
the drop-shipper.
C. Unauthorized “Offer to Sell” as a Form of Patent Infringement
1. The Purpose of the “Offer to Sell” Language in § 271(a)
35 U.S.C. § 271(a) did not originally include a restriction on
“offer to sell” patented items. Congress modified § 271(a) by
adding “offer to sell” in response to the TRIPS agreements. The
courts have repeatedly held this to be a strengthening of patent
rights. “The amendment to § 271(a) represents a distinct change to
the bases for patent infringement, because liability arose previously
only as the result of an actual sale.”69 Now a patent owner does not
have to wait for an infringing sell to bring a suit against an infringer.
The court explained in In re Biogen that “an offer to sell is a
distinct act of infringement separate from an actual sale” and it
“differs from a sale in that an offer to sell need not be accepted to
constitute an act of infringement.”70 In fact, an “unauthorized ‘offer
to sell’ a patented invention within the United States creates a
separate cause of action for patent infringement. . . . The
geographic location and physical destination of the subject matter
of the ‘offer’ appear to be immaterial . . . , so long as the ‘offer’ was
made in the United States.”71
The policy behind the inclusion of “offer to sell” in 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(a) was explained in Transocean “to prevent ‘generating
interest in a potential infringing product to the commercial
detriment of the rightful patentee.’”72 In other words, the purpose
of including “offer to sell” was to dissuade retailers or sellers from
having any interest in patent infringement. Under an offer-to-sell
analysis, the court will not need to consider the timing or
completion of a first and second transaction, because an infringing
“offer to sell” occurs before the sale is complete.73 Thus the right to
exclude an unauthorized “offer to sell” more fully protects the

69. 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc., 160 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
70. In re Biogen ‘755 Pat. Litig., 335 F. Supp. 3d 688, 745 (D.N.J. 2018) (quoting
Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., 617 F.3d
1296, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2010)).
71. Wesley Jessen Corp. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 228, 233 (D. Del. 2003).
72. Transocean, 617 F.3d at 1309 (quoting 3D Sys., Inc., 160 F.3d at 1379).
73. Id.
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rights of the patent owner by expanding infringement to activity
which anticipates the sale.
2. Drop-Shippers May Be Liable for Patent Infringement Under an
Unauthorized “Offer to Sell”
An understanding of what constitutes an offer to sell is drawn
from traditional contract law.74 An alleged infringer must
“communicate[] a ‘manifestation of willingness to enter into a
bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that
his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it.’”75 For
example, the ability to pre-order an item on a website did not
constitute an offer because “pre-orders did not contain a projected
delivery date,” and “marketing efforts [did not] . . . include specific
terms and sufficient definiteness . . . .”76 Conversely, a “buy now”
button was probably enough to constitute an offer because a
consumer could expect that by pressing the “buy now” button they
were accepting an offer and the terms of the sale were definite and
would be completed.77 It should also be noted that the Federal
Circuit has consistently held that activities which would not
normally amount to an offer under contract law do, in fact, amount
to an offer when the court is considering infringement by an
unauthorized offer to sell.78 Put simply, what may not be an “offer
to sell” in contract law, may still be an “offer to sell” under
infringement law. This essentially tips the scale of ambiguous
infringement cases in favor of the IP owner.
Patent exhaustion also applies to an “offer to sell.” A seller who
is selling a product from the secondary market is not liable for
offering to sell that product. As this applies to drop-shippers, the
analysis would be the same as discussed above except that the
74. Moy, supra note 45.
75. In re Biogen, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 745 (citation omitted).
76. QR Spex, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc. 507 F. Supp. 2d 650, 660 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
77. Altinex Inc. v. Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., SACV 13-01545 JVS (RNBx), 2016 WL
6822235, at *10–11 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016).
78. Moy, supra note 45 (“What emerges from the Federal Circuit decisions handed
down to this point is thus a practice that is undisciplined and to some degree misdescriptive.
Nominally the decisions espouse fidelity to contract law; the direct assertion is that only
activities that meet the definition of a formal offer will qualify as an infringing offer for sale.
In application, however, the decisions insist on a good deal less; speaking generally, a
statement that communicates both a description of the infringing good and a price will be
taken as sufficient to establish infringement. This is done without any real investigation into
how the scenarios under consideration would be treated under specific authorities in contract.”).
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analysis begins before the drop-shipper has even found a buyer for
the product. Before the drop-shipper has a buyer, she has only an
offer for sale on an e-commerce website and no question that the
drop-shipper has not purchased the product to extinguish the
patent over a particular item. In fact, the offer for sale is not tied to
a particular item at all. Therefore, the analysis for patent exhaustion
is straightforward: no first sale and no exhaustion.
Conversely, drop-shippers could argue that they are not selling
an item from the primary market even without having ownership
of the secondary market item because they have access to an item
on the secondary market. For example, if drop-shippers are aware
of a distributor that is selling the item through the secondary
market, they might argue they made offers to sell items from the
secondary market. However, in patent exhaustion case law it
appears that patent exhaustion only applies to the owners of the
particular item that the patent has exhausted. In simple terms, the
drop-shipper cannot offer to sell someone else’s exhausted product;
it must be their own. However, it is not without merit to imagine
that a seller could obtain the rights to sell an item on the secondary
market without actually obtaining title to that product. Therefore
drop-shippers may be able to make a convincing claim under
this theory.
There are many cases of patent infringement under “offer to
sell” for counterfeit products. These cases are analogous to the
drop-shipping cases because the offers for sale portray themselves
to be authentic products. It is not required for a sale to be complete
to constitute patent infringement, and thus, whether the product
turns out to be authentic is of little consequence. A person can offer
to sell a patented item only if (1) the person is an authorized
licensee or (2) the patent has exhausted over the particular item.
Patent infringement cases of unauthorized “offers to sell” are
often brought against large e-commerce hosts like Amazon, eBay,
and Alibaba, and not against individual drop-shippers or
distributors.79 This is likely because of the difficulty of bringing a
suit against individual infringers, discussed above. The courts
usually rule in favor of the e-commerce platforms because these
hosts are not the actual sellers of the infringing product, nor do they
79. Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1251 (W.D. Wash. 2015);
Blazer v. eBay, Inc., No. 1:15-CV-01059-KOB, 2017 WL 1047572, at *3 (N.D. Ala. Mar. 20,
2017); Altinex Inc. v. Alibaba.com Hong Kong Ltd., No. SACV 13-01545 JVS (RNBx), 2016
WL 6822235, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016).
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portray themselves to be the sellers.80 That being said, the holding
in Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com suggested that such a lawsuit
against an individual seller would be successful, because the sellers
do not have the same excuse.81
In Milo & Gabby, LLC, the plaintiffs brought a suit against
Amazon for direct and indirect patent infringement by providing a
platform which encouraged its users to infringe patents and
because Amazon knew such activities were likely.82 At the district
court level, the plaintiffs argued that patent infringement existed
under “offer to sell” but the court denied the pleading because it
was obvious to a buyer on Amazon’s platform that Amazon was
not the seller of the item thereby implying a suit brought against
the individual seller might be successful.83 Following this logic, if a
defendant drop-shipper offers to sell a patented product—as did
the sellers in Milo and Gabby, LLC, Blazer v. eBay, Inc., and Altinex
Inc. v. Alibaba.com—then a suit against the drop-shipper would
likely be successful.
Though the ruling was against the plaintiffs in Milo & Gabby,
LLC, the court was “troubled by its conclusion” and provided some
insightful dicta regarding the current state of patent infringement
law.84 The court was specifically concerned about the impact that a
holding in favor of e-commerce platforms has on small businesses.85
The court recognized that Amazon makes it unbelievably easy for
someone to set up a patent-infringing business.86 While Amazon may
try to prevent infringement, it seems that it does not do much. “As
a result, Amazon enables and fosters a market place reaching
millions of customers, where anyone can sell anything, while at the
same time taking little responsibility for ‘offering to sell’ or ‘selling’
the products.”87 Evidently, as the court concluded, the law lingers

80. Milo & Gabby, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54; Blazer, 2017 WL 1047572, at *3;
Altinex Inc., 2016 WL 6822235, at *10–11.
81. Milo & Gabby, LCC, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–54, aff’d Milo & Gabby LLC v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 693 F. App’x 879 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
82. Milo & Gabby, LLC, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1251.
83. Id. at 1253.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. In court, an Amazon representative testified that sellers are able to offer their
products on Amazon “by simply filling out an online information form, [agreeing] to
Amazon’s terms and conditions, and providing certain banking information.” Id. at 1253.
87. Id. at 1253.
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behind technology.88 The purpose of “offer to sell” in § 271(a) was
to prevent any interest in patent infringement and protect the
patentee, and yet “[i]n this instance, the Court is not convinced that
such purpose has been fulfilled. However, that is a subject which
must be addressed to Congress and not the courts.”89 It seems the
Federal Circuit would have preferred to find e-commerce platforms
liable for their part in facilitating patent infringement but was
limited by the law that “lags behind technology.”90
In conclusion, under an unauthorized “offer to sell” a patent
infringement case is more likely to succeed because (1) the policies
favor the patent owner, and (2) it is not necessary for the court to
determine when the sale of the item is complete, like it would under
an unauthorized sale infringement analysis. Under this approach a
court will not have to decide at which point the sale is complete,
nor will a court need to consider whether the patent owner was
justly compensated. An unauthorized offer to sell occurs before
either of these questions occur. This avenue is a cleaner and simpler
approach to patent infringement and plenty analogous case law.91
A suit against a drop-shipper for patent infringement via an
unauthorized “offer to sell” would likely succeed.
II. TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
Another legal issue is how drop-shipping relates to trademark
infringement. The basis of trademark law is to protect the consumer
from product confusion. While other forms of intellectual property
are highly concerned with the rights of the IP owner, trademark law
is more focused on the consumer. That being said, some rights are
reserved for the trademark owner to protect their goodwill and
reputation. Therefore, if the actions of drop-shippers cause
customer confusion or damage the goodwill and reputation of the
trademark owner, they may be liable for trademark infringement.
Trademark owners are concerned with product delivery
because distribution can affect the goodwill associated with the
trademark. Presumably, a damaged reputation and goodwill
causes lost profits. Because drop-shippers interfere with product

88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id. at 1254.
Id. at 1253.
Id. at 1252–53.
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distribution, trademark owners are concerned with dropshipping activities.
Trademark owners whose products are being sold via dropshipping are concerned about the quality control of their products.
Namely these trademark owners view the shipping time of the
product to be inherent to the quality of the product. Often, dropshippers will increase shipping time of a product because the order
is being fulfilled by a different distributor. This is a common
problem experienced by drop-shippers.92 Because most consumers
are unaware that they are purchasing from a drop-shipper, the
damage to reputation from overly long ship times may be
associated with the trademarked product or owner. It follows that
trademark owners should be allowed a mechanism to control the
delivery parameters of their products. It is possible that that a
customer prefers certain distributors, so when the product arrives
from a different distributor, the customer may be disappointed, once
again risking damage to the trademark’s goodwill and reputation.
Another concern is poor customer experience. When a dropshipper acts as the distributor and customer service representative,
the trademark owner has no has no control over customer
experiences. For example, a customer may have questions about or
may want to return a product sold by a drop-shipper and the dropshipper would be their point of contact. While a trademark owner
has contractual levers over distributors and licensees to control
consumer interactions, the trademark owner has no control
over drop-shippers.
However, the rights of the trademark owner are limited by
trademark doctrines. Two of these trademark doctrines, trademark
quality control and trademark dilution, are explained along with
their potential application to drop-shipping below.
A. Trademark Quality Control
Although trademark owners are very concerned with the
delivery of their products to the consumer, “[t]he general rule is
that a trademark owner cannot stop someone from selling genuine
goods bearing a true mark, even if the sale is without the mark

92. Alan Young, How to Deal with Long Shipping Times When Dropshipping with
AliExpress, ITSALANYOUNG.COM (Jan. 3, 2018), https://itsalanyoung.com/deal-longshipping-times-dropshipping-aliexpress/.
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owner’s consent.”93 With that said, courts have interpreted the
Landham Act to prohibit actions that diminish the trademark
owner’s ability to control the quality of the products,94 such as those
that are “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to
deceive.”95 Courts are motivated by giving the trademark owners
the rights necessary for them to protect their goodwill and
reputation. Therefore, the courts have expanded non-genuine
products to include those which “do not conform to the trademark
holder’s quality control standards . . . or if they differ materially
from the product authorized by the trademark holder for sale.”96 In
fact, where a material difference exists in the product, the courts
will draw an exception to the first sale doctrine and allow the
trademark owner to exercise control over the product as part of the
secondary market.97 However, if the trademark owner is able to
adequately control the quality through authorized distributors, the
courts are less likely to find trademark infringement.98
Courts are especially less likely to find trademark infringement
in cases where the “material difference” in the final product is not
a defect or lack of quality control that might result in a defect.99
In Matrix Essentials, the trademark owner preferred their product
to be sold by authorized distributors.100 However, it was eventually
sold by an unauthorized retailer.101 The court was not convinced
that this constituted a material difference because the product was
identical in quality to that sold by the authorized distributor.102 The
trademark owner tried to argue that a label explaining

93. CCH INC., DISTR. L. ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES & PRAC. § 4.08 (2021) 2019 WL 4467796.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1051; J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25:42 (5th ed. 2021).
95. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(a)–(b).
96. MCCARTHY, supra note 94 (quoting Zino Davidoff SA v. CVS Corp., 571 F.3d 238,
243 (2d Cir. 2009)).
97. MCCARTHY, supra note 94.
98. Id.; see also Shell Oil Co. v. Com. Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 108 (4th Cir. 1991).
99. Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Emporium Drug Mart, Inc., 988 F.2d 587, 591 (5th Cir.
1993) (The “common thread” in the prior cases “is that each involved some defect (or
potential defect) in the product itself that the customer would not be readily able to detect. The
oil, shoes, and beer from Shell, El Greco, and Coors all contained or could potentially contain
a latent product defect due to the unauthorized distributor’s failure to observe the
manufacturer and mark owner’s rigorous quality control standards.”); see also MCMARTHY,
supra note 94.
100. Matrix Essentials, Inc., 988 F.2d at 589.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 590, 593.
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“professional dispensing only” would confuse a customer when
the product was not being sold by a professional source. However,
the court found that this would not cause consumer confusion
because the consumer was not confused about what product they
were purchasing.103
Under this framework, a drop-shipper is likely not liable for
trademark infringement. The final product which is delivered to
the customer is identical to the products being sold by authorized
distributors because it is the product being sold by the authorized
distributors. Through the same reasoning, the quality control is also
within the control of the trademark owner (who controls the
authorized distributors). As such, there will be no “material
difference” with the final product purchased by a drop-shipper.
The trademark owners whose products are sold by drop-shippers
will be similarly barred from trademark remedies. If there is a
“material difference” between a drop-shipper’s product and a
distributor’s product, such as a difference in ship time, the
difference can be easily remedied. As long as the drop-shippers
“take the necessary steps to adequately alleviate this confusion and
prevent injury to the trademark’s goodwill—by, for example,
sufficiently disclosing that the product differs from the originally
sold product—those differences will be unlikely to trigger the
liability. . . .”104 Even if a court chose to find different ship times to
be a “material difference,” a drop-shipper would simply need to
disclose the difference to a purchaser to avoid liability for
trademark infringement.
That said, some courts have found a material difference where
the sale lacked the original manufacturer’s warranty.105 Therefore,
a trademark owner may be able to claim material difference by
offering a warranty for the product among its authorized
distributors. Assuming the drop-shippers are unable to offer the
same warranty to the buyer, this would qualify as a material
difference that would result in trademark infringement liability for
the drop-shipper.

103. Id. at 591.
104. Beltronics USA, Inc. v. Midwest Inventory Distrib., LLC, 562 F.3d 1067, 1074 (10th
Cir. 2009) (Defendant’s disclosure on its eBay sales was found to be insufficient.); see also
MCCARTHY, supra note 94.
105. MCCARTHY, supra note 94.
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B. Trademark Dilution
Another potential trademark doctrine where a trademark
owner could reclaim rights after the first sale is trademark dilution.
In addition to goodwill and reputation, a trademark owner is also
interested in the branding of her product. Often, the price point of
a product is an essential element of this branding. Therefore, a
trademark owner might try to argue dilution of the trademark by
the effect on pricing. Further, increased shipping times could also
result in dilution of the trademark (as discussed in detail above).
Finally, when a consumer discovers the drop-shipping scheme, it
can be a negative experience which might also dilute the
trademark. The doctrine of first sale also does not apply to
trademark dilution. In other words, a trademark owner can reach
beyond the first sale to control the trademark if dilution occurs.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) explains the necessary elements of
trademark dilution:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark
that is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness,
shall be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at
any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, commences
use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous
mark, regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely
confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury.106

The fame requirement is the narrowest and most difficult step of
the dilution analysis.107 Most cases will be ruled out at this first step
because it is a very difficult standard to achieve.108 “The fame
requirement is so important that the Second Circuit advised trial
courts to determine the fame question as an initial gateway issue
before going further to analyze a dilution claim.”109
In determining whether or not a trademark is famous, the
American Jurisprudence explains “A mark is famous if it is widely
recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as
a designation of the source of the goods or services of the
trademark’s owner.”110 The following are factors of a famous
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
MCCARTHY, supra note 94, at § 24:104.
Id.
Id.
98 AM. JUR. 3D 313, Proof of Dilution of a Trademark § 6 (2007).
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trademark: duration and extent of the trademark use; amount,
volume, and extent of sales; the actual registration; and whether the
mark was registered.111 Also, the court will not rule a trademark as
famous if the mark is only well-known in “‘niche’ markets.”112
On another note, the mark must be a household name to be
famous enough for trademark dilution.113 Proving secondary
meaning will fall short of the “fame” needed for dilution; the fame
necessary is a higher bar than the bar for distinctiveness and “very
few are ‘famous. ‘“114 For example, Coach Handbags filed a suit for
trademark dilution against a tutoring business also named
“Coach.”115 The court ruled in favor of the defendant because
Coach did not qualify as famous and because its name is a common
English word.116 The court explained “[i]t is well-established that
dilution fame is difficult to prove.”117
Most activities of drop-shippers will fall outside the category of
trademark dilution automatically because very few trademarks are
famous marks. However, if a trademark owner is successful in
proving their mark is famous, the court is not likely to find the
activities of a drop-shipper to be infringing.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. MCCARTHY, supra note 94, at § 24:104.
114. Id. See id. at § 24:108 for examples of marks held famous under 1996 Federal Act :
“AOL; ARTHUR THE AARDVARK cartoon character; AUDI vehicles; BARBIE doll;
BUDWEISER beer; CAMEL cigarettes; CANDYLAND children’s game; CARTIER luxury
goods; DON’T LEAVE HOME WITHOUT US slogan for traveler’s checks and credit cards;
ETCH-A-SKETCH for drawing toy; fish-shaped GOLDFISH brand crackers; FORD motor
vehicles; THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH slogan for a circus; HOTMAIL e-mail service;
INTERMATIC electrical products; JAMES BOND movie character; JEWS FOR JESUS
religious organization; LEXINGTON investment advice services; NAILTIQUES fingernail
care products; NASDAQ stock market services; NATIONAL BASKETBALL ASSOCIATION
logo; NIKE sports shoes and apparel; PANAVISION movie and TV cameras; POLO wearing
apparel; PORSCHE autos; PROZAC anti-depression drug; THE SPORTING NEWS
newspaper; TOYS ‘R US toy stores; TYLENOL analgesic; VELVEETA cheese products;
VICTORIA’S SECRET womens’ lingerie and wearing apparel; WAWA chain of 500
convenience stores in five eastern states, in use for 90 years; WINSTON cigarettes.”
115. Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
116. Id. at 1373.
117. Id.; see also Toro Co. v. ToroHead, Inc., 61 U.S.P.Q.2d 1164, 1180 (T.T.A.B.
2001) (“Fame for dilution purposes is difficult to prove.”); Everest Capital Ltd. v. Everest
Funds Mgmt., LLC, 393 F.3d 755, 763 (8th Cir. 2005) (“The judicial consensus is that ‘famous’
is a rigorous standard.”); MCCARTHY, supra note 94, at § 24:104 (noting that fame for dilution
is “a difficult and demanding requirement” and that, although “all ‘trademarks’ are
‘distinctive’—very few are ‘famous’“).
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Assuming a trademark owner can show their mark is famous,
they will provide evidence of dilution through blurring or
tarnishment. Because the drop-shippers are selling actual product,
the case will come under tarnishment. Courts are wary of dilution
and have limited “tarnishment” to disparaging uses. For example,
“Enjoy Cocaine” would be a disparaging use of COCA-COLA’s
popular “Enjoy Coke” slogan.118 Dilution does not occur even
where “a product whose commercial status, reputation and quality
is held in high esteem, or at least is of higher price and quality than
plaintiff’s product. So long as the defendant’s use does not place
plaintiff’s trademark in a degrading or disparaging context,
tarnishment will probably not be found.”119 The activities of a dropshipping scheme will likely not amount to tarnishment as the dropshipper is trying to sell product, not disparage against it. As a
result, it is unlikely that a drop-shipper will be liable to a trademark
owner for trademark dilution.
III. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
Copyright is an original work of authorship fixed in a tangible
medium.120 Copyrighted materials include literary works, musical
works, sound recordings, pictorial, sculptural works, motion
pictures, architectural works, or similar works.121 Infringement of a
copyright is an unauthorized copying of these works.122 Most dropshippers never personally handle the products they are selling, let
alone copy them. The most applicable form of copyright
infringement does not directly result from copying the products, but
rather copying the marketing materials used to sell the products.
When creating a virtual store, a drop-shipper may copy the
photos and product descriptions created by the IP owners to create
a product listing. As the simplest form of factual copying, the IP
owner must only show access and direct evidence of the copying
which has a striking similarity to the original to show direct
infringement.123 Some drop-shippers will try to modify the product
images and descriptions as to not directly infringe the copyrights.
118. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183, 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
119. J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution by Tarnishment, 4 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:89 (5th ed. 2019).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
121. Id.
122. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a).
123. Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 1976).
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In this case, the IP owner still has options under reproduction rights
or derivative work rights.
The biggest problem that IP owners face in a copyright
infringement claim is an organization technique used by large ecommerce platforms. The feature nests similar items offered for sale
by different sellers under the same product listing. In other words,
the IP owner will create a product listing with their copyrighted
images and descriptions. Drop-shippers and other sellers will
identify the product listing and list the same product for sale, which
the e-commerce host will combine into a single listing. The ecommerce hosts provide a link for a buyer to click which says “see
other sellers” or “other seller options” where other sellers and
prices are listed. Therefore, a drop-shipper can list an item for sale,
including photos and product descriptions, without any actual
copying of the copyrighted material.
Where copyright infringement occurs during drop-shipping, it
is usually straightforward, but it does not occur often because of
the capabilities provided by large e-commerce hosts to sell without
infringing a copyright.
IV. PRESCRIPTIVE ACTION
One possible solution is proposed below that would allow the
patent owners to have control over the primary market of their
intellectual property but would also allow drop-shippers to
continue their businesses.
Only the IP owners, and their authorized licensees, should be
allowed to sell their items on the primary market in order to
preserve their exclusive rights to the primary market. One way this
could be achieved is by only allowing the IP owners the right to sell
an item as “new” on e-commerce platforms. E-commerce hosts
have product distinctions or conditions for new and used items.
Typical labels include “new,” “like new,” “fair,” “acceptable,” and
“poor.” The “new” market is representative of the primary market.
A drop-shipper, or other second-hand seller, could be required to
sell the item as “like new” or the like because it is part of the
secondary market. Under this scheme, e-commerce platforms
would be required to limit access to and monitor listings or sellers
that sell items as “new.” For example, a seller may not have access
to sell an item as “new” on an e-commerce platform until they have
provided evidence to the e-commerce platform that they are an IP
owner, licensee, or that the product does not have IP. Similarly, IP
1648
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owners could be given avenues to list authorized sellers and report
unauthorized sellers who are selling their items as “new.”
Giving the IP owner, and authorized licensees and distributors,
the sole right to sell an item “new” on e-commerce platforms
ensures that the owner has control over the primary market of her
property. In other words, the IP owner is given the ability to control
the rights already given to her under current IP laws. In fact,
allowing only the IP owners to list an item for sale as “new” has
benefits beyond the issues of drop-shipping because it would
inhibit counterfeit markets as well. This distinction also reflects the
customer’s expectations of what it means to buy an item “new.”
Most consumers expect that a “new” item will be shipped directly
from the original source or an authorized distributor.
Often, customers are willing to pay a premium to be assured
the item they are purchasing is authentic and directly from
the manufacturer.
The drop-shipper will likely argue that this limitation will have
a chilling or clogging effect on the drop-shipping business model
because a drop-shipper will likely lose customers by not being
allowed to sell an item as “new.” What’s more, this will likely
reduce drop-shippers profit margins because “like new” items may
have a lower value than “new” items. On the other hand, this
requirement will not have the same chilling effect that courts are
concerned about. Usually, courts are not concerned about a loss of
customers or reduced prices of the secondary market; rather, they
are concerned about the liability of sellers on the secondary market
to the IP owners (by extending the IP owner’s rights beyond the
first sale). Requiring that a drop-shipper sell items as “like new”
does not completely eliminate the ability of a drop-shipper to
continue their business, nor does it increase their liability to an IP
owner, but rather helps the drop-shipper to avoid liability. Many
customers are willing to take an item that is “like new” for a lower
price. Most importantly, by offering a patented item for sale as “like
new,” it does not appear that the drop-shipper is attempting to sell
a patented item during the term of the patent. It signals that the
drop-shipper is obtaining title to a product over which the patent
has already been extinguished.
The patent owner will likely argue that even under a “like new”
listing the drop-shipper has still committed infringement because
they have not yet obtained title to a particular item. However, it is
important to appreciate the trend of courts to embrace new
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technologies and markets despite the concerns that IP owners raise.
The purpose of IP is to promote progress and often the biggest
proponents of limiting progress are IP owners who are concerned
about losing their rights. The best way forward is not to eliminate
disruptive technologies that encroach on the IP owner’s rights, but
rather to find a way to use them to the IP owner’s advantage.
This solution offers the balance courts are trying to achieve
between the rights of the IP owners and a concern for clogging the
channels of commerce. It maintains an important right of the IP
owner, the right to sell their product for the first time, while also
providing an avenue to drop-shippers to continue their businesses.
CONCLUSION
Drop-shipping represents an evolution of the market that is
inevitable with the age of the internet. As the business model gains
popularity, it will eventually be considered by either the courts or
legislators. Therefore, the analysis here will be relevant to those
discussions when they occur.
It seems that the activities of a drop-shipper are largely noninfringing activities. Though a drop-shipper can infringe on
copyright and trademarks, often they do not. Copyright
infringement only occurs where a drop-shipper copies the images
and descriptions from an IP owner’s marketing tools and uses them
in their own virtual store. However, e-commerce platforms have
provided a solution for this by nesting “other sellers” under the IP
owner’s listing. Also, the activities of the drop-shipper likely do
not constitute trademark infringement because the drop-shippers
do not personally handle (or warehouse) any of the products
and the IP owners maintain quality control through their
authorized dealers.
However, a drop-shipper may run into trouble with an
unauthorized offer to sell a patented item. These activities clearly
constitute patent infringement because the drop-shipper does not
have title to a particular patented item and therefore has not
exhausted the patent over that item. The drop-shippers are offering
for sale a patented item during the term of the patent in the United
States, which is patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
One solution to the conflicting interests of IP owners and dropshippers is to allow only IP owners to sell an item as “new” and
require drop-shippers to sell the items as “like new.” This signals
to consumer which sellers are authorized distributors of a product
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and allows an IP owner to control the primary market for its
products. This solution also allows for a drop-shipper to continue
their businesses on the secondary market where the IP owners’
rights have extinguished.
This analysis was focused only on the rights and laws regarding
IP owners. Many of the products which drop-shippers sell do not
have any IP protection at all. This does not mean these activities are
lawful and not prime for conflicts in the courts. Because dropshipping businesses harm IP owners, it is likely that IP owners will
continue to try and find an avenue to litigate against drop-shippers.
As such, further study needs to be done to examine drop-shipping
under unfair competition or privacy rights. But for now, at
least patent, trademark, and copyright owners have some grounds
for remedy in the courts and drop-shippers have a way of
continuing their businesses while reducing the risk of violating the
owners’ rights.
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